From Neoliberalism to Neo-Feudalism
To understand the rise of the far-right we need to analyze the social and economic consequences of the neoliberalism phase
The specter that has haunted Europe for at least a decade is that of frustration, currently channeled through the far-right vector and politically transformed into hatred. Reactionary forces have been advancing for years in many European countries, and it is very likely that in the coming weeks we will witness another demonstration of strength in the French legislative elections.
The reactionaries have worked more on building new consensuses than on coercion, although they have not abandoned the latter at all, especially when they come to power, as demonstrated by the case of Argentina. Their influence is evident in the penetration of all spheres of the state, from the judiciary to the state security forces and bodies, as well as major corporations and senior officials. They have colonized different social groups with the help of a large accumulation of communication tools, generous funding, and a political strategy aimed at managing the great wave of frustration and anger generated by neoliberal failure.
The theoretical neoliberal project, as proposed by Hayek or Friedman, was based on separating the demos (the poorest part according to the original definition; all citizen subjects in its updated version) from political affairs. The very construction of the European Union was built on the ordoliberal thesis—the Germanic neoliberal current—according to which certain economic matters, due to their nature, should be reserved for experts and removed from the realm of democratic decision-making. In sum, technocracy.
The management of Central Banks is the paradigm of this approach, according to which a realm as important as monetary policy should be removed from public debates. In practice, this has meant that conservative economists have steered monetary policy against the opinion of governments and, thus, against electoral outcomes. Recent examples include the Central Bank of Brazil, which continues the reactionary struggle against Lula's government with artificially high interest rates, or the European Central Bank, which for a decade demonstrated an unhealthy obsession with so-called neoliberal economic adjustment.
Neoliberalism has been aptly described as a cynical project where profits were privatized while losses were socialized, evident in the governmental response to the financial crisis. However, much less attention has been paid to monetary policy. In 2013, Mario Draghi, then President of the European Central Bank, appeared before the Spanish Congress. On that occasion, I had the opportunity to reprimand him for a monetary policy aimed at favoring the rentier class, with no concern for the social conditions of workers. I pointed out that the poor management of his predecessor should be enough to face legal consequences, and that he might also have to do the same for contributing to the dismantling of public services that provide social cohesion.
Ironically, a few months ago, Draghi acknowledged in a conference that European policy, by focusing on reducing wage costs, had weakened demand and the social model. Now he seems very concerned not only about industrial policy in Europe but also about the stability of the European social model.
The problem is that neoliberalism has left a deep mark on society. The relevant question is: what kind of socio-political subject could a policy designed to expel the demos from the public sphere while disciplining it in the workplace create?
The neoliberal adjustment that the European population suffered from 2008 until at least 2014 was not just an economic policy aimed at cleaning up public finances. It was, above all, a class policy to discipline the working classes. These policies, a combination of fiscal austerity (tax cuts for the rich and hikes for the poor), monetary austerity (policies benefiting creditors and against debtors), and industrial austerity (wage and labor repression), led to the destruction of public services and community bonds and the growth of inequality.
Neoliberalism was creating a social subject that, far from the theoretically conceived neoliberal—said to be rational, autonomous, and free—manifested a destructive, reactionary, apolitical, and deeply nihilistic drive. Neoliberalism disciplined the working class, subjugating it through wage and civil repression, to accept the natural order of things under capitalism. In this way, it constituted a disbelieving, apathetic, individualistic, fearful, and very frustrated subject. Exactly the breeding ground that new reactionary movements continue to cultivate.
Everywhere, from the United States to Argentina, including Spain, France, or Brazil, reactionary forces point to ethnic minorities, feminism, and the economic and cultural values of the left as responsible for the ills afflicting contemporary society. These ills may be perceived as economic deterioration or a sense of grievance, or a combination of both.
In a context of eco-social crisis, where the absolute scarcity of certain resources essential to the current development model is increasingly evident, the idea inoculated through these values is the creation and protection of zones of privilege (ethnic, national, and class). What looms on the horizon are not democratic societies, not even minimal ones, but neo-feudal formulations where moral orders of privilege are restored for the aggrieved sectors (whites, men, natives).
Ink continues to flow among progressive intellectuals on how to stop the reactionary beast. There is no consensus, and the most appropriate solutions probably depend on national singularities. But if we want to prevent the reactionary beast from continuing to feed on citizen frustration, one of the central goals must be to rebuild community bonds, especially public services, and labor freedoms. Barriers against the far-right, based on democratic values, and the expansion of workers' rights and freedoms. The more I think about it, I see no other formula.